ASSESSING THE MERITS OF THE CTBT
David Hafemeister

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the nonproliferation regime have
been weakened; perhaps no other issue demonstrates this as dramatically as the status of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the ratification of which the U.S. Senate rejected
in October 1999. Despite the U.S. rejection, the test ban has strong international support*the
most recent vote to promote the CTBT in the UN General Assembly passed overwhelmingly, with
175 votes to 1 (the United States) and three abstentions. The Obama administration favors U.S.
ratification of the CTBT, but this is no guarantee that Washington will ratify the test ban. Members
of Congress must weigh the benefits and risks of signing the treaty; however, these calculations
can sometimes be difficult to carry out. This article examines whether a return to nuclear testing
would in fact benefit the United States, or if a test ban would be a greater contribution to U.S.
national security.
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When considering whether to ratify an arms control treaty, U.S. senators should cast their
votes based on the treaty’s net benefit. After evaluating all aspects of the agreement, they
should consider whether the treaty, taken as a whole, will increase or decrease national
security. In the case of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), this involves
asking a series of questions, including: would a resumption of nuclear testing help or
hinder efforts to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT)? If the United States resumed testing, would other countries follow suit, and would
this diminish U.S. security? Is nuclear testing essential to maintaining the nuclear stockpile?
And is the CTBT effectively verifiable via the International Monitoring System and National
Technical Means?
When the Senate first considered the CTBT in 1999, a majority of senators concluded
that it would not enhance national security, and it was rejected. The Obama administration
reportedly plans to resubmit the treaty for ratification next year, before the start of the
2010 NPT Review Conference.1 Much has changed over the last decade, including views
about nuclear weapons. Significant progress has also been made in deploying
technologies to verify compliance with the CTBT [see ‘‘Verifiability, Reliability, and National
Security: The Case for U.S. Ratification of the CTBT,’’ in this issue]. This viewpoint assesses
the security-related aspects of the treaty from a U.S. perspective and seeks to counter the
claims of treaty opponents that ratification of the CTBT would diminish rather than
strengthen U.S. national security.

Nuclear Testing and the Modernization of Nuclear Forces
If nuclear testing ever resumes, China has the most to gain. China has tested only forty-five
times, compared to 1,030 U.S. tests. China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force of
some two dozen liquid-fueled missiles could attack the western United States with singlewarhead missiles. There is increasing speculation that China would like to miniaturize its
nuclear weapons in order to carry multiple warheads on its ICBMs, but this would be
possible only if China conducts additional tests. Thus, the CTBT will help prevent further
technological advances in Chinese warheads.
Russia is planning to retain as many as 1,500 deployed strategic warheads.2 Russia’s
liquid-fueled ICBMs are scheduled to be withdrawn by about 2020. A return to testing
would give the Russian military leaders political leverage to modernize and expand their
aging nuclear forces.
India and Pakistan are actively improving their nuclear forces, and additional nuclear
tests would allow India (followed by Pakistan) to develop smaller, more sophisticated
thermonuclear bombs. North Korea probably has about a half-dozen nuclear weapons
(and has conducted two low-yield tests). Although it poses only a modest security threat
at present, both because North Korea has no reliable delivery system and because there is
some question as to whether either of its nuclear tests were fully successful, further testing
could change that.

The Stockpile Stewardship Program
In 2002, a U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel determined that U.S. warheads
could remain safe and reliable without testing if the United States could meet certain
conditions, among them maintaining a high-quality workforce, using the Stockpile
Stewardship Program (SSP) to examine weapons components, and refurbishing old
weapons by remanufacturing them to original specifications.3
The NAS panel repeatedly asked weapon designers during classified briefings on the
enduring stockpile whether testing was needed to resolve problems encountered or likely
to be encountered with the arsenal and the scientists, and engineers always responded
that testing was not necessary.4 (The most likely potential source of nuclear-related
degradation is the possibility that the primary yield falls below the minimum level needed
to ignite the secondary. The National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA] has
concluded that plutonium pits have a minimum lifetime of 4560 years [now 100 years]
with ‘‘no life-limiting factors as yet recognized.’’) The NAS panel concluded:
Although a properly focused SSP is capable, in our judgment, of maintaining the required
confidence in the enduring stockpile under a CTBT, we do not believe that it will lead to a
capability to certify new nuclear subsystem designs for entry in the stockpile without
nuclear testing*unless by accepting a substantial reduction in the confidence in
weapon performance associated with the certification up until now, or a return to earlier,
simpler, single stage design concepts such as gun-type weapons. . . .

It seems to us that the argument to the contrary*that is, the argument that
improvements in the capabilities that underpin confidence in the absence of nuclear
testing will inevitably lose the race with the growing needs from an aging stockpile*
underestimates the current capability for stockpile stewardship, underestimates the
effects of current and likely future rates of progress in improving these capabilities, and
overestimates the role that nuclear testing ever played (or would be ever likely to play) in
ensuring stockpile reliability.5

In light of the fact that the United States has not needed to test in the last seventeen
years (since the moratorium began), the panel’s conclusions make sense. As I have
summarized previously, ‘‘Each year the U.S. government has stated that it is ‘confident that
the stockpile is safe and reliable, and there is no requirement at this time for nuclear
tests.’6 The annual certification on stockpile readiness requires the secretary of defense
(after advice from Strategic Command and the military services) and the secretary of
energy (after advice from the three weapons laboratory directors and the NNSA
administrator) to determine whether all safety and reliability requirements are being
met without the need for nuclear testing. These reports have always certified that the
stockpile does not need testing for reasons of safety or reliability.’’7 The NAS panel also
concluded that testing is not necessary, provided that the United States maintains a robust
SSP, there are no new weapon designs, and the United States reserves the right to
withdraw from the CTBT if it determines nuclear testing is in its national security interest.
The enduring U.S. stockpile is projected to consist of more than 5,000 warheads
(about 50 percent operational and 50 percent in reserve) with seven different types (two
gravity bombs, two ICBM warheads, two SLBM warheads, and one cruise missile
warhead).8 Collectively, these warheads have been tested some 150200 times.9 There
has been considerable progress in the SSP, including the following:
. The Life Extension Programs for the W76 and W87 warheads have been successful;
. Los Alamos National Laboratory reestablished its ability to fabricate new pits (for the
W88 warhead).
. The NNSA (reviewed by the JASONs) determined that plutonium pits will not have
aging effects for at least 85 to 100 years.
. Aging problems with non-nuclear components can be tested; in the past, warheads
were rarely tested for reliability.
. A more robust tritium transfer system has been devised.
. The margins-to-uncertainties ratio has improved as margins have been increased and
uncertainties reduced.
. Progress has been made in three-dimensional calculations, using the Dual Axis
Radiographic Hydro-Test Facility at Los Alamos and the National Ignition Facility at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Owing to conservative planning criteria, the yield delivered to any given target is
usually much larger than what is actually needed to destroy it, so the only primary issues
are: does the weapon explode, and is the delivery system sufficiently accurate? Since there

are seven warhead types in the enduring stockpile, a failure of one type would shift
responsibility to some of the other six types. NNSA does not consider the criteria for
nuclear missions in any depth, since targeting is left to the Strategic Command (and, in any
case, delivery system accuracy does not require nuclear testing).
There are some common misunderstandings when it comes to assessing warhead
reliability. The United States has not conducted enough full-scale tests on each warhead
type to determine reliability with high statistical confidence, and it has certainly not
accounted for the effects of aging. If we assume ten reliability tests were performed
on each warhead and all ten were successful, the reliability is not 100 percent with
100 percent confidence. Instead there is a 30 percent chance that reliability is less than
90 percent and a 10 percent chance that reliability is less than 80 percent.10 Thus, even
when the United States was testing weapons dozens of times each year (or more), it has
never known warhead reliability with precision at the time the warhead entered the
stockpile, nor has it searched sufficiently for aging effects with confidence tests. In other
words, when a few successful tests give the design yield, the reliability of a warhead type is
defined as 1.0, but without a confidence level. If problems arise, the reliability is reduced
somewhat arbitrarily.
Because nuclear weapons have on the whole proven extremely reliable, the
Department of Energy (DOE) historically only conducted about one test per year to
examine the reliability of all the deployed warhead types. Contrary to popular belief,
nuclear testing has not played a large role in determining the reliability of nuclear
weapons. Rather, non-explosive monitoring and testing has played the dominant role in
assessing the confidence in the reliability of nuclear weapons.
The NNSA had a fiscal 2008 budget of $6.6 billion for weapons activities, including
the SSP, which is significantly greater than the Cold War budgets (in inflation-adjusted
dollars). Testing data obtained from DOE with a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
is discussed below.11 These and other data suggest that primary/secondary stages do not
show significant aging problems once they have been in the field for a few years. The
average age of discovery for warhead retrofits was 1.8 years after the first production unit.
Sidney Drell and Robert Peurifoy discussed the technical issues involved with a nuclear test
ban.12 They quantified warhead reliability as follows: ‘‘Since the start of the current
stockpile evaluation and reliability assessment program in 1958, about 13,000 weapon
evaluations have been conducted. During this period, the failure rate of the non-device
hardware suggests an expected weapon failure rate of 12% for the stockpile.’’

When is Testing Required?
To mitigate the effect of potential nuclear bomber-related accidents, the B61 gravity bomb
was reconfigured to use insensitive high explosives. In addition, the W80 was modified to
handle the extremely cold temperatures encountered during flight. The NAS panel stated:
The question of whether nuclear testing might ever be needed to correct problems
discovered in weapons certification and deployment generated some controversy in the

1980s. However it was shown that almost all of the problems cited in support of this
proposition were either of a kind not requiring nuclear testing or represented cases
where testing had been inadequate during development. In relating these experiences to
the current situation it is also important to note that the observed failures all occurred
within three years after entry into the stockpile. The weapons in today’s active stockpile
have long passed the age where anomalies in initial production units are a significant
problem. Furthermore, they are all based on tested designs that have taken advantage of
lessons learned from older vintages.13

Non-nuclear components, which can be examined, tested, and replaced without the
need for detonating a warhead, represent the main threat to warhead reliability. Some of
the problem areas that have been identified include: degradation of high explosives,
insufficient tritium, corrosion of fissile materials, faulty cables, and pilot parachutes.14

Reliability for Nuclear Weapon Missions
The NNSA annually certifies the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, without considering
nuclear targeting or delivery systems. As I explained in an earlier work, ‘‘the ability to destroy
a target depends on: the hardness (H) of the target (minimum destruction pressure); the
yield (Y) of the weapon; the accuracy of the weapon (CEP, circular error probable); the
reliability (R) of the weapon system (01); and the number (n) of warheads attacking a target
(taking into account fratricide).15 The single-shot-kill-probability (SSKP) is the kill probability
of a single warhead on a known target with perfect reliability of R1.’’16 For warheads with
less than perfect reliability, the kill probability of one warhead on a target is P1 SSKP x R. I
initially assume very lethal warheads with SSKP1, giving a kill probability for one warhead
of P1 R. ‘‘If n independent warheads from n missiles are used on a target without fratricide
[when one incoming weapon destroys another], the kill probability is Pn 1  (1  R)n.
Reliability of R 0.5 gives [P1 0.5,] P2 0.75 and P3 0.88, and R0.25 gives [P1 0.25,]
P2 0.44 and P3 0.58. Except for the case of a pre-emptive attack against a large force,
additional warheads on a target can be used’’ when there are uncertainties.17
What’s important to understand is that even a reduction by a factor of two in the
yield does not have much of an impact on the desired results of the mission. Consider two
cases*the W88 warhead of 455 kilotons (kt) and the W76 warhead of 100 kt. In both cases
we will assume a 100-meter accuracy attacking a 2,000 pounds per square inchhardened
silo with 0.9 reliability. Table 1 lists the P1, P2, and P3 probabilities for yields of the W88 (455
kt), the W88-2 (228 kt), the W76 (100 kt), and the W76-2 (50 kt).
TABLE 1
Kill probability versus yield.

P1
P2
P3

455 kt

228 kt

100 kt

50 kt

0.90
0.9894
0.9983

0.88
0.9849
0.9981

0.80
0.957
0.991

0.67
0.888
0.963

For the case of a 50 percent reduction in the 455 kt yield of the W88 larger weapon,
there is only a small reduction in the kill probabilities. A reduction to 228 kt reduces P1 by
2 percent, from 0.90 to 0.88, but P2 drops only 0.5 percent, and P3 drops even less at 0.05
percent. For the case of a reduction of 50 percent in the 100 kt yield of the W76 small
weapon, the effect is larger, but certainly manageable. A reduction to 50 kt reduces P1 by
16 percent, from 0.80 to 0.67, and P2 drops by 7 percent and P3 drops even less at
3 percent. The 450 ICBM warheads with yields of mostly 335 kt are closer to the case of the
W88. Thus, major reductions in yield of up to 50 percent do not change the outcomes of
the strategic weapon attacks.
Today, there is strong agreement that the main mission of nuclear weapons is to
deter nuclear attacks by other nations, and that nuclear weapons do not deter terrorists
who are non-state actors. Ivan Oelrich, acting president of the Federation of American
Scientists and director of its Strategic Security Program, examined fifteen missions for
nuclear weapons.18 Fourteen of the missions can be handled with multiple warheads on
each target. Only the fifteenth mission, a pre-emptive attack on Russia, requires an
extremely reliable nuclear force structure with many counterforce warheads.

Nuclear Weapons Safety
Nearly every publicly acknowledged U.S. strategic nuclear accident has involved aircraft
(twenty-nine cases out of thirty-two total). Just one U.S. nuclear weapon accident has
occurred since 1968, when a dropped wrench fell onto a liquid-fueled Titan II ICBM in a silo
in Arkansas, triggering an explosion that destroyed the silo and the missile but did not
spread radioactivity. Two aircraft-related accidents (in 1966 and 1968) spread significant
amounts of radioactivity. However, accidents involving aircraft are no longer relevant,
since aircraft no longer carry nuclear weapons unless they are placed on a special national
security alert (or are being transported).
A 1992 law required the Defense Department to carry out a costbenefit analysis
(without specifying criteria) on the addition of new safety features that require nuclear
testing to ensure high reliability. Officials from both the George H.W. Bush administration
(Robert Barker in 1992) and the Bill Clinton administration (John Deutch and Rear Admiral
John Mitchell in 1993) testified the enhanced safety measures were not needed because
the costs were significant and the benefits were minor. There is a consensus that there are
no significant safety problems requiring modifications that in turn need nuclear testing to
confirm their status.19

The Survivability of U.S. Strategic Forces
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, commonly known as the Moscow Treaty)
allows the United States and Russia 2,200 strategic operational warheads by 2012 with the
freedom to mix basing modes. The United States reached the 2,200 limit in February 2009.
The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will lower this number, to perhaps 1,500.

The U.S. strategic force is likely to maintain the traditional triad of fourteen Trident
submarines (twelve operational and two in maintenance), 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, and
fifty-six B-52 and twenty B-2 heavy bombers. The 2,200 operational warheads will reside on:
Tridents (1,440), Minutemen III (450), and heavy bombers (some 300).20 The United States
also maintains 2,500 non-operational warheads with a combination of two Tridents (240) in
overhaul, tactical bombs on mostly F-15E aircraft (500) and in inactive reserve (790),
submarine-launched cruise missiles (100) and inactive reserve (200), and air-launched cruise
missile and bombs (700).21 Thus, the total number of U.S. warheads will be about 5,000.
Russian strategic forces are projected to have 1,500 operational strategic warheads
in 2025, assuming that all SS-18s and SS19s have been dismantled.22 Russia currently is
building ten SS27s (Topol-M) per year, probably with three warheads each. There
continues to be slow progress in three areas: Borey submarines, Bulava submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and Tu-160 (Blackjack) heavy bombers. It is projected
that Russia’s strategic forces of 2025 might consist of 1,500 warheads with 400 warheads
on SS-27 missiles, perhaps 600700 on eight submarines (with difficulty) and 400500
warheads on 30 Tu-160 heavy bombers.23 This number could be reduced with a new
strategic arms control treaty.
Only Russia is capable of launching a significant preemptive attack on U.S. strategic
forces, but such an attack would be suicidal and unsuccessful. Analysts usually employ
worst-case analysis, assuming that the attack is effective, without practice on real, multiple
targets. Russia could easily destroy all U.S. heavy bombers at their three or four bases, as
they usually are not on alert. A preemptive attack could destroy 3350 percent of SLBMs
(or 500700 of 1,440 warheads). Russia could destroy, at best, some 80 percent of U.S.
ICBMs (or 360 of 450 warheads). Table 2 displays, using calculations based on a worst-case
scenario, a surviving U.S. force of 8001,100 warheads, plus reserves.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) considered the effects from very
large violations of START I and II.24 A surviving U.S. force of 1,000 warheads would have
few Russian strategic targets, since Russian launchers would be empty. U.S. forces could be
supplemented with a responsive/reserve force of up to 1,000 warheads, but with wide
variations in how quickly such weapons could be made ready. The survivable U.S. force of
1,000 warheads would not be meaningfully affected by unobserved CTBT testing
TABLE 2
U.S. surviving warheads under SORT.
A worst-case analysis is used to determine the strength of the U.S. response force.
U.S Destroyed

U.S. Survived

300 (all heavy bombers off alert)

0

500700 (3350 percent of SLBMs)

7001,000

350 (80 percent of ICBMs)

100

Total



1,150 1,350



800 1,100 � reserves

Source: David Hafemeister, Physics of Societal Issues (New York: Springer, 2007), Ch. 2.

violations at very small yields. The SFRC reports considered breakouts of the following
types: numbers of warheads, mobile missiles and other missiles, modernization, numbers
of re-entry vehicles on a missile, cheating on downloading, and failure to destroy missiles
and nuclear weapons. The potential violations to the two START treaties were shown to be
not militarily significant, since a response force of 1,000 warheads would not be
jeopardized by massive cheating. In short, the CTBT is effectively verifiable because
CTBT violations are far less threatening to U.S. strategic forces than potential violations
under START, which has been shown to be effectively verifiable.

Net Benefit Analysis and Conclusion
The NAS panel considered three scenarios*a CTBT (with compliance), no CTBT, and CTBT
(with evasion) for seven nations (Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran).
It concluded, ’’The worst-case scenario under a no-CTBT regime poses far bigger threats to
US security interestssophisticated nuclear weapons in the hands of many more
adversariesthan the worst-case scenario of clandestine testing in a CTBT regime, within
the constraints posed by the monitoring system.’’25
In 2001, General John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
delivered a report that examined the net benefit of the CTBT by considering all aspects,
including the ramifications of a world with and without a CTBT.26 The benefits of U.S.
ratification of a test ban treaty ‘‘clearly outweighed’’ the risks. The advantages as
Shalikashvili saw them included:
. The Test Ban Treaty will complicate and slow down the efforts of aspiring nuclear
states, especially regarding more advanced types of nuclear weapons.
. It will hamper the development by Russia and China of nuclear weapons based on
new designs and will essentially rule out certain advances.
. It will add to the legal and political constraints that nations must consider when they
form their judgments about national defense policies.
. The Test Ban Treaty is vital to the long-term health of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and will increase support for other elements of a comprehensive non
proliferation strategy.
. The United States is well positioned to sustain its nuclear deterrent under the Test Ban
Treaty.
. The verification regime established under the Treaty will enhance the United States’
own very capable nuclear test monitoring system and foster new techniques to
improve verification.
. The Treaty will make it easier to mobilize domestic and international support for
clarifying ambiguous situations and for responding vigorously if any nation conducts
a nuclear test. 27

Though Shalikashvili’s assessment was written nearly a decade ago, his benefit
analysis has stood the test of time. Ratifying the CTBT and seeing it enter into force remain

strongly in the U.S. national security interest*a conclusion supported by the above
analysis as well.
Both the NPT and the CTBT regimes are weakened by a United States that fails to
ratify the CTBT. Without U.S. ratification of the test ban, China and Russia are more likely to
return to testing and to modernization that depends on testing, thus reigniting the
nuclear arms race, and without ratification of the CTBT, the United States also has less
leverage against the nuclear transition states of Iran, North Korea, India, Israel, and
Pakistan. The president can withdraw from the CTBT with a pen stroke; if a return to
testing is required in the future, the United States can do so. There is greater global
consensus on the positive merits of the CTBT than on any other arms control treaty; the
time for Washington to act is now.
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